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Abstract: In a sale transaction, parties to the contract are allowed to pronounce an offer using words 
which do not indicate a sale. He may use the word such as hibah in the offer as long as the nature of 
the contract is exchange. Nomination is a means to expedite the process of the administration of a 
deceased Muslim’s estate. It is commonly practiced in financial institutions such as insurance and 
takaful companies, Pilgrimage Fund and Employee Provident Fund. An issue arises as regard to the 
status of nominee, as a trustee or beneficiary. A fatwawas issued by the National Fatwa Committee in 
1973 stating that a nominee acts only as a trustee. However, the decisions of the civil courts and the 
Shari`ah court show that a nominee could be a beneficiary. This research is undertaken to examine the 
Islamic legal maxim and its relevance to the principle of nomination in Malaysia. Here, even though it 
is a nomination form and the nominee appointed is merely a trustee according to the 1972 fatwa, the 
wordings of the nomination might indicate a different connotation. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
There is an Islamic legal maxim, which states that the basis to be considered informing a contract is the 
meanings and intentions, and not words and forms. It meansthat in a contract of sale for example, parties to the 
contract maypronounce words which do not indicate a sale. He may use the word suchas hibahin the offer as 
long as the nature of the contract isexchange. The contract is a valid sale contract because both parties indicate 
their consents to the exchange between the object and the price. Here, even though it is a nomination form and 
the nomineeappointed is merely a trustee according to the 1972 fatwa, the wordings of thenomination might 
indicate a different connotation. It does not necessarilymean that a nominee is a trustee but it depends on the 
meaning of the nomination clause. 
 
The concept of nomination and its practice in malaysia; nomination constitutes a contract in islamic law: 
‘Aqd in Islamic Law is a means of creating obligations by either a single or two intentions. Literally it 
denotes tying, knitting, joining and locking (Haqqi, 1999). As discussed by scholars, the term has specific and 
general meanings. For the specific meaning, the term has been defined technically as a relationship of the speech 
of one of the contracting parties with that of the other according to the Shari‘ah in a way that its effect appears in 
the object (Hassan,2005). Article 103 of the Mejelle defined it as the two parties taking upon themselves an 
undertaking to do something.It is specific because it confines `aqdto the connection between two intentions and 
singles out obligations arise from the single intention. For the general meaning, al-Jassas defined it as what the 
contractor commits himself to do, or commits others to do on binding bases (Nawawi, 1999). This implies that 
`aqd includes both the single as well as the two intentions to create obligations. From these two definitions, it is 
understood that `aqd in Islamic law can be bilateral such as sale, hire and agency. Hence `aqd may be translated 
as a contract as understood in English law, which is concluded by two parties through their pronouncement of an 
offer and an acceptance respectively.  However, `aqdcan also be unilateral such as divorce, endowment and 
ibra`or remission of debt and as such, it is different from a contract. 
In order to constitute an `aqd, there are fouressential elements that must exist namely the existence of two 
parties, the proceeding of what indicates the consent of both contracting parties i.e. ijab (offer) 
&qabul(acceptance), the connection of offer & acceptance and the appearance of the effect of tying the 
acceptance to the offer in the object, i.e., transfer of ownership of the subjectmatter. Parties must mutually agree 
with the terms of the contract. This constitutes the most important requirement of a valid contract (Ayyub, 2003). 
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This is based on the Qur`anic verse (al-Nisa`, 4:29) to the effect “O you who believe, devour not your property 
among yourselves by unlawful means except that it be trading by your mutual consent”. 
Zamakhshari explains that the contracting parties must mutually agree on the terms of the contract at the 
time they pronounce the offer and acceptance respectively (Zamakhshari, 1995). Such a requirement is also 
mentioned in a hadith: “The contract of sale is valid only by mutual consent” (al-Zuhayli, 1989). The consent is 
originally a mere intention and hence, must be manifested through the verbal offer and acceptance. Without 
manifesting it, it is not sufficient to conclude the contract. Other acceptable means which function similarly are 
allusion, writing and gestures as long as they could manifest the presence of consent. However, there arises a 
juristic discourse on the reason why the contracting parties opt for other means instead of spoken words. 
The subject matter of a contract is not confined to the physical object but it includes the creation, transfer, 
extinguish or release of rights (Haqqi, 1999). Generally, there are four conditions for the subject matter namely; 
existence, deliverability, ascertainability and suitability.All these are important in order to avoid negative 
elements such as gharar or uncertainty, deception and manipulation that could affect the consent of any party to 
the contract. In ensuring that the subject matter fulfills the conditions, the Islamic law allows the modification of 
the means so that it is suitable and practicable in any situation provided that it does not break its general 
principles.  
Under English Law, nomination is a method of testamentary disposition. Unlike a will, it can be made by an 
adult and even by a minor who has attained the age of 16. It is effective upon the death of the person who makes 
such a nomination. In fact, it is a direction of an individual to the person holding the relevant funds on his/her 
behalf to pay the funds to a named person on his/her death (Clive, 1993) . It has been defined as the naming by a 
member of a friendly society of a person to take his interest in the society on his death, without the need for a 
formal will (Oxford Dictionary of Law, 1990). It was originally intended to avoid the incurrence of the expense 
of making a will especially for those with little property (Sawyer, 1998). It is revocable by a subsequent 
nomination and not by a will.  
In Malaysia,nomination is applicable to funds such as the Employee Provident Fund, Post Office Savings 
Bank, Insurance and Co-operative Societies. It can be classified into two groups, namely the statutory 
nomination which consists of savings accounts in the financial institutions and a nomination that has the effect of 
creating a trust in favour of the nominee such as the proceeds of life insurance policies (Merican, 2004). 
Concerning the status of the nominee, the National Fatwa Council had issued a fatwaon 9th October 1973 
that he or she, by way of nomination holds such position as no more than a trustee. The complete fatwa reads: 
“Nominees of the funds in the Employees Provident Fund, Post Office Savings Bank, Insurance and Co-
operative Societies are in the position of persons who carry out the will of the deceased or the testator. They can 
receive the money of the deceased from the sources stated to be divided among the persons entitled to them 
under the Islamic law of inheritance.”[1974] 1 MLJ x. 
The fatwawas issued due to the uncertainty of the position of the nominee of a Muslim’s property. For non-
Muslims, the practice is very clear that is the nominee is the beneficiary or the recipient of the property. 
However, as far as Islamic law is concerned, it was argued that the nominee is not the beneficiary or the recipient 
but as a mere trustee. Accordingly he is under the responsibility to divide and distribute the propertyto the legal 
heirs of the deceased as laid down in the fara`id system.  
For example, with respect to funds kept in financial institutions like the Employers Provident Fund and 
Pilgrimage Fund, there are two court cases that can be referred to. In re Ismail Rentah[1940] MLJ 77, the 
deceased had nominated his daughter as nominee to receive his shares and benefits in the co-operative society in 
which he was a member, upon his death. The Court held that the daughter was a trustee and not a beneficiary. 
She could receive the property as a trustee and is responsible to distribute it to the legal heirs of the deceased as 
prescribed in the fara`i system. Raja Musa J. held that such a nomination would not constitute a hibah because 
there was no transfer of ownership to the nominee.  
The judge arrived at the conclusion after studying the wording of the letter of nomination. The letter reads: 
“Whereas I, Ismail bin Rentah, living at Terusan…. do nominate/ appoint in the presence of two witnesses 
Maznahbinti Ismail living at Terusan and who is related to me by way of being my child as being the person who 
may receive all my money in the said society if I die in accordance with the provisions of section 22 of the Co-
operative Society Enactment 1922.”   
The judge concluded that the nomination was in fact a bequest. However it was an invalid bequest as the 
nominee appointed was an entitled legal heir and the other legal heirs had not consented to it. In fact, he also 
considered the case from the point of view of there being a hibah, but due to there being no transfer of ownership 
to the donee, the hibah failed.  
In re Man Bin Minhat[1965] 2 MLJ 1, the deceased took out an insurance policy for RM40,000 on his life. 
He assigned the policy to his wife as the nominee that the benefit of all moneys under the policy shall be payable 
to her upon his death. The High Court decided thatthe wife is fully entitled to the insurance money when the 
insured person dies. The Court held that the moneys payable under the insurance policy did not form part of the 
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estate of the deceased. The Court also held that it is lawful for a Muslim to dispose off his property during his 
life time by way of a gift or through trustee.  
The above decision was followed by the Malaysian High Court in the case of re Bahadun bin Haji 
Hassan[1974] 1 MLJ 4. The deceased had taken out a life insurance policy and the sum assured was made 
payable to his wife as the nominee. Disputes arose as to whether the nominee is beneficially entitled to the 
moneys due under the policy on the death of the assured or whether the moneys constitute part of the estate of 
the deceased on his death to be distributed among his legal heirs under fara`id system. It was argued that since 
the wife was nominated as the beneficiary she was entitled to receive the money for her own benefit. The Court 
held that it was it was a complete gift from the insured to the nominee when he nominated the latter in his life 
insurance policy. 
The court did not follow the fatwa.on the status of nominee that was issued in 1973.  The principle of 
binding precedent was strictly applied and the Court followed the principle laid down in re Man Bin Minhat, 
even though the case was decided prior to the issuance of the fatwa. It appears that the judges contended that the 
insurance money belongs to the insured. It is therefore permissible for the insured to make it as a gift or hibahto 
the nominee after his death.Based on this finding, it can be argued that is indeed no difference in essence 
between the 1973 fatwawhich states that the position of a nominee is a trustee and the judges’ understanding with 
regard to the ownership of the insurance money. According to the 1973 fatwa, the nominee must distribute the 
money to the insured’s heirs and this means that the money is part of the insured’s estate or in other words, it 
belongs to the insured. Therefore he should be allowed to make it as a hibahin favour of his nominee. In other 
words, the fatwa and the judges are of the common opinion that the insurance money belongs to the insured, and 
it can be the subject matter of hibah and can be distributed under fara`id system.  
With regard to nomination under conventional life insurance, it is worth mentioning that on 15th June 1972, 
the National FatwaCouncil had issued a fatwa that the conventional life insurance contract is prohibitedbecause 
it contains the elements of gharar, maysir and riba. This implies that the money payable under the policy is also 
prohibited. Therefore, it should not be the subject matter of inheritance on the basis that the deceased has no 
ownership over something that is prohibited. Islamic law only recognizes properties that are legally 
acquired.Qur`anic verse (al-Nisa`, 4:29) states to the effect “O you who believe, devour not your property among 
yourselves by unlawful means except that it be trading by your mutual consent”. 
Al-Tabari explains that the examples of prohibited wealth are riba, gambling and others, which are 
prohibited by Allah (s.w.t.) (Tabari, 1992). Wealth, which is earned through illegitimate means such as robbery, 
riba (including bank interest), rishwah (corruption), gharar-based transactions, stealing or gambling, is not 
subject to inheritance. Furthermore, the legal ownership is a condition for the heritability of wealth. If the 
ownership is not legitimate, it is not valid to transfer it to the deceased’s legal heirs. This is odd with the 
Malaysian fatwa related to the nomination under conventional life insurance policy. The fatwa issued on 20th 
September 1973 stated that it is the responsibility of the nominee appointed by the insured to distribute the 
money which is prohibited acquired wealth in Islamic law, according to the fara`id law. 
In this regard, section 167(1) of the Malaysian Insurance Act 1996 (Act 553) provides that when a Muslim 
nominee receives the policy moneys upon the death of the policyholder, he or she receives it as an executor and 
the money payable constitutes part of the estate of the policyholder which is subjected to the payment of any 
debts. Furthermore, section 167(2) provides that the nominee is under a responsibility to distribute the policy 
moneys in accordance with Islamic law. Here, it is not clear whether the ‘Islamic law’ stated in section 167(2) is 
the Islamic law of succession as no further statutory explanation is given. However, taking into account the 
statement of the former Minister as well as the position that the money payable is part of the estate of the 
deceased policyholder as stated in section 167(1), it is reasonable to assume that the term refers to the Islamic 
law of succession. 
The Shari‘ah Court in Wan Puziahv.Wan Abdullah bin Muda&Another [2001] JH June 235,also decided that 
the nominee is a beneficiary. The plaintiff who was the adopted daughter of the deceased claimed her share in the 
deceased’s savings in the Pilgrimage Fund. She was appointed as the nominee by the deceased during her 
lifetime. It had been declared by the deceased in the nomination form that upon her death, the plaintiff would 
receive half of her savings in the Pilgrimage Fund. It was contended by the plaintiff that the nomination 
constituted a valid bequest. However, her contention was challenged by the defendants, who were nephews and 
heirs of the deceased. They argued that the nomination did not amount to a bequest and the moneys must be 
distributed in accordance withfara`id law. Ismail Yahya H held that the nomination by the deceased depositor for 
her savings account with the Pilgrimage Fund in favour of the plaintiff was a bequest. In his judgment, the judge 
initially referred to the fatwa issued in 1973 by the National Fatwa Council, but due to the absence of any 
stipulation regarding the nomination under the Pilgrimage Fund’s regulations i.e. lacuna, the judge viewed that 
he was free to refer to the sources of Islamic law and accordingly applied his own reasoning. 
After this case, the Pilgrimage Fund is believed to have introduced a new form of nomination clause. This 
new form expressly defines the responsibility of the nominee appointed. Upon receiving the deceased’s 
deposited money from the Pilgrimage Fund, he must distribute it in accordance with the Shari`ah principles 
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(ARB, 2007).It is clear that the position of the nominee for the accounts deposited at the Pilgrimage Fund, is a 
trustee. There should be no further dispute over the nominee’s position whether as trustee or beneficiary as 
previously disputed, as it clearly states that the nominee must distribute the money as laid down in the Shari`ah. 
The present nomination clause for the takafulbenefits is also clear. It mainly differentiates the position of 
nominees for Muslim participants, as trustee and for non-Muslim participants, as beneficiary. The dispute over 
the position of the nominee would not arise. For instance, the nomination form prescribed by the eTiqa Takaful 
of Malaysia which allows the participant to appoint several nominees. For Muslim participants, generally the 
nominee acts as a trustee but, for certain takaful products namely Takaful Amal, Takaful Alif&Takaful Insan), the 
nominee is the beneficiary and would receive the takaful benefits on the basis of “hibah” (gift).All nominees 
appointed would receive the hundred percent of the takaful benefits but the company would pay the amount only 
to one nominee following the sequence of the appointment. This implies thatif the first nominee predeceases the 
participant, the hundred percent of the benefits shall be paid to the second nominee and so forth. The form also 
defines clearly the responsibility of the nominee that is the takaful benefits must be distributed to the legal heirs 
of the participant upon his death, as this is the part of the instruction given to the nominee and is agreed upon by 
the participant. It further elucidates that for non-Muslim participant, the nominee(s) are the recipients of the 
takaful benefits and would be entitled to the benefits based on the percentage indicated. If the nominee 
predeceases the participant, his or her portion shall be divided equally among the surviving nominee and would 
be distributed in accordance with the Distribution Act, 1958. 
However, the nomination form currently practiced by the Employee’s Provident Fund (EPF) 
seemsinconsistent. Even though the form clearly states that the nominee of the Muslim participant is a wasi or 
executor, the mode of appointment indicates differently (EPF). There appear conflicting elements between the 
clause of appointment and the stated position of the nominee as an executor. The participant may appoint more 
than one nominee, but he is required to state the percentage that every nominee would receive from the money 
upon his death. This is in fact similar to a wasiyyah document. Besides, this would cause difficulties among legal 
heirs when it comes to the distribution of the propertyunder fara`i. There is no clause in the EPF’s nomination 
form which states that upon the death of the participant, and upon the courts’ request or any similar clause which 
has the effect of necessitating nominees to withdraw and present the money for distribution process. If any of the 
nominees refuses to withdraw the money or lives abroad, it would cause the delay of the distribution. In other 
words, there is possibility that the distribution of the EPF money to the legal heirs of the dead participant would 
be conducted in several occasions. This would defeat the purpose of nomination which is initially to speed up the 
process of distribution. The legal heirs might also receive the amounts as prescribed in the Shari`ah in stages 
depending on which nominees would execute the responsibility swiftly.   
 
Under Which `Aqd That Nomination Is Categorized? 
a) Wasiyyah: 
Making awasiyyahor bequest which is a means of property disposal is recommended to all Muslims.  It is 
testamentary succession which is an option for a Muslim to disburse his wealth upon his death (Pearl, 1987). It is 
based on the deceased’s wishes and is effective upon his death which means that it must be carried out before his 
estate is distributed according to the fara`idsystem. It was originally incumbent upon every Muslim following the 
revelation of the Qur`anic verse al-Baqarah (2): 180, which apparently states that there is an obligation upon a 
Muslim close to death to make a bequest in favour of his parents and next of kin. However, according to the four 
Sunni schools of law, this original ruling was abrogated by the revelation of the Qur`anic verses al-Nisa` (4): 
11,12 and 176 and the hadith of the Prophet (s.a.w.) ‘no bequest in favour of legal heirs’ (al-Shawkani, hadith 
no. 2515).   
However bequest is not an absolute right of a Muslim. He cannot make a bequestin favour of his legal heirs. 
If he does, the consent or refusal of the entitled heirs is decisive (Coulson, 1971).  There is no single Qur`anic 
verse prohibiting a Muslim from making a bequest in favour of legal heirs. This limitation is based on a number 
of sound Prophetic traditions that state that making a bequest in favour of legal heirs is not permitted. According 
to theHanafis, if the deceased makes a bequest in favour of an heir who is entitled to his property under 
inheritance, such a bequest, if not consented to by the other legal heirs, is invalid.  This is on the basis that 
bequests made in favour of legal heirs need the approval of the other legal heirs. This argument is based on the 
hadith that narrates that if other legal heirs consent, the bequest is effective (San`ani, 1986). On the other hand, 
the majority view that the bequest is void. However, if the other legal heirs agree, the legatee is entitled to the 
property. This opinion is based on the hadith that Allah has specified the details of the rights of every legal heir, 
and hence they have no further right under a bequest.  
Another limitation is pertaining to the quantum.A Muslim is allowed to make bequest up to 1/3 of the whole 
estate. This is based on the hadiththat Sa`ad bin AbiWaqassaid:The Prophet came to visit me in the year of the 
farewell pilgrimage when I was afflicted with a severe illness. I said to him: “O Prophet (s.a.w.), you see how ill 
I am. I have property and no heir except my daughter. Shall I then give away two-thirds of my property as 
alms?” He replied “No.” I said “A half then?” He still said “No.” I then asked “A third?” He replied: “A third. 
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And a third is much. It is better that you leave your heirs rich than you should leave them destitute, begging from 
their neighbours.” (Bukhari,hadith no 2742 and Coulson,1971). 
 
b) Hibah: 
The hibah is a mode of property disposal which is operative during the lifetime of the donor. Unlike fara`id 
and wasiyyah, which become effective upon the death of the deceased or the testator, a hibah is effective 
immediately (Caroll, 1994). It is a contract voluntarily made during the lifetime of the donor vesting the 
ownership of the corpus of property to a person without consideration (al-Sharbini, 1958).The recommendation 
of making a hibah contract is unanimously agreed on by Muslim scholars as it is an act of helping each other in 
the course of righteousness and piety as inspired by the Qur`anic verse (5:2). It reads “They ask thee what they 
should spend (in charity). Say: “Whatever ye spend that is good, is for parents and kindred and those in want and 
for wayfarers, and whatever you do that is good- Allah (s.w.t.) knoweth it well.There are also hadiths that read: 
“exchange gifts among yourselves so that love may increase among you”and “if any one seeks to take back a gift 
he is like a dog who returns to its vomit.”(al-San`ani, 1986 and al-Shawkani, 1995). 
It is a contract-based agreement, and hence the general principle applicable to the contract is that it needs the 
pronouncement of an offer and acceptance from the donor and the donee respectively. This is to ensure that the 
contract is based on the mutual consent of both parties. Muslim scholars differ on the issue of whether the 
ownership is transferred with the mere acceptance of the offer or when possession is taken of the property. The 
Hanafis and the Shafi`is hold the view that taking possession by the donee is a condition to make the contract 
luzum, or binding. This is based on the practice of the Righteous Caliph AbuBakr regarding the case of his hibah 
of dates in favour of his daughter, `Aishah who did not take it until he was on his deathbed(Ibn`Abidin,1404H 
and al-Sharbini, 1958) The non-binding effect of the contract means the ownership of the property remains with 
the donor and the contract is not binding on him/her. However, to the Malikis, possession is a condition for the 
completion of hibah. It is not a condition of its validity. This opinion is based on the analogy with a sale contract 
(IbnRushd, 2003). Taking possession is the right of the donee. The mere acceptance by the donee renders the 
contract complete and the ownership is therefore transferred to the donee. Once the contract is concluded by the 
mere acceptance of the donee, he may be compelled to take possession. Furthermore, even though taking 
possession is the right of the donee, if he delays it until possession is lost through the illness or insolvency of the 
donor, his right is annulled (IbnRushd, 2003). In consequence of this, there is no need to obtain permission from 
the donor for the possession of the property because the transfer of ownership occurs with the mere acceptance of 
the donee. 
 
c)Wisayah: 
Wisayah is trusteeship. It is a means to create a trust under Islamic law. It has been defined by al-Sharbini as 
an instruction given to a person to carry out certain things after his death(al-Sharbini, 1958). Al-Zuhayli explains 
it as the appointment of a person to administer the deceased’s estate, including the manner in which the estate is 
to be distributed (Al-Zuhayli, 1989).This is similar to a will made under the Malaysian Wills Act, 1956, which is 
applicable to non-Muslims. In making such a will, the testator is allowed determine the beneficiaries of his 
property and the quantum each of them would be entitled to. He is also permitted to insert everything in the will 
document including his instructions of the manner the property is supposed to be distributed as well as the 
appointment of a guardian. 
Section 2 of the Malaysian Wills Act, 1959 (Act 346) defines will as a declaration intended to have legal 
effect of the intentions of a testator with respect to his property or other matters which he desires to be carried 
into effect after his death and includes a testament, a codicil and an appointment by will or by writing in the 
nature of a will in exercise of a power and also a disposition by will or testament of the guardianship, custody 
and tuition of any child. In Islamic law, this is in fact a combination between wasiyyah and wisayah and Muslims 
are encouraged to utilize the means of a willto fasten and mitigate the process of the distribution of their estates 
under Islamic inheritance law. 
With regard to the significance of trusteeship, Dr.MuzammilH.Siddiqi, former President of the Islamic 
Society of North America viewed that in countries where the Islamic law of succession is not recognized, a 
Muslim is under religious responsibility to prepare a will before his death. This is based on his contention that 
without leaving a will, his wealth would be distributed according to the law of the country, where he or she lives, 
and not according to the Shari`ah. If such thing happens, he or she would be held responsible on the Day of 
Judgment for the negligence committed in a very important matter (Islamonline). 
 
The Applicability Of The Maxim “In Contract Effect Is Given To Intentions And Meanings Not To Words 
And Phrases” In Determining The Nominee’sstatus Either As A Trustee Or A Beneficiary: 
According to Kamali, legal maxims are theoretical abstraction in the form of usually of short epithetic 
statement that are expressive, often in a few words of the goal and objective of the Shari‘ah(Kamali, 2006). They 
are constructed basically in simple forms and few words but they carry meanings which are comprehensive and 
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applicable to various issues of fiqh. In other words, they are important general rules of fiqhfunctioning as 
principles in deducing rules of fiqh(Laldin, 2006). They are known in Arabic as al-qawa`id al-fiqhiyyah. Mustafa 
al-Zarqa`definedit as general fiqhprinciples which are presented in a simple format consisting of the general rules 
of Shari`ah in a particular field related to it (al-Zarqa`, 2004 and Laldin, 2006). As an example is the maxim 
"matters are judged by intention" which is comprehensive and applicable tovarious issues of fiqh such as ibadah 
,muamalat, and andjinayah. However, legal maxims function as to facilitate the understanding of problems and 
principles and nothing more. This means that a judgment cannot be based on maxims unless they are endorsed by 
the Qur`an orhadith (Mahmassani, 2000). 
The maxim “in contracts effect is given to intention and meaning not to words and forms”, according to 
Zaydanfalls under its major maxim that is “al-umur bi maqasidiha” which means matters are determined 
according to intention (Zaydan, 2001 and Mahmassani, 2000). The latter implies that the effect of any particular 
action or transaction must be in accordance with the intent underlying such action or transaction. This is based on 
the hadith narrated by `Umar r.a. that the Prophet (s.a.w.) had said: “Deeds are judged by intentions and every 
person is judged according to his intentions” (Bukhari, hadith no. 1). Therefore, an act of a human being is 
judged in the light of his intention or purpose. If a person finds something on the street and takes the object with 
the intention of returning it to the owner, his conduct is in order and he is considered as the keeper (amin) of the 
item, but if he intends to keep the item as his own, he is considered to be a person wrongfully appropriating 
property (ghasib) (Laldin, 2006). The item found is kept by him in both situations but his intention or purpose in 
keeping it makes the two situations different from each other. 
Muslim scholars do not fix specific words to constitute a contract. Instead, every contract is constituted by 
that which indicates its meaning and idea clearly, regardless whether this indication is express or by allusion 
(Hassan, 2005). The maxim “in contract effect is given to intentions and meanings not to words and phrases” can 
be applied in the situation of ambiguity for example, that arises from the pronouncement of offer.When a person 
makes an offer to sell his car, he may utter “I donated this car to you for RM40,000.” This pronouncement would 
in fact lead to the creation of a sale contract, not a donation.Applying the maxim, though the word ‘donated’ is 
uttered, it is a sale because its nature is an exchange between the object and the price. `Azzam explains that 
pertaining to human being transactions, it is the meaning that constitutes the actual objective, not the express 
words (`Azzam, 2005). 
 
Conclusion: 
Nomination constitutes an `aqdor contract in Islamic law. It is similar to a contract of agency which is 
pertaining to delegating the other to act on its behalf, which constitutes its subject matter (AAOIFI, 2007). There 
exists confusion among the Muslim as to the status of a nominee either a trustee or beneficiary. Even though 
there is a fatwa that has been issued since 1973, but the civil and Shari`ah court practices show that the judges 
have their own approaches to decide. The judges had examined the nomination clause in detail before issuing the 
judgment. This is to determine the real intention of the deceased who had appointed the nominee, whether to act 
as a trustee or to receive it as a beneficiary. This practice is in fact in line with the Islamic legal maxim “in 
contract effect is given to intentions and meanings not to words and phrases”. In this regard, the fatwa issued in 
1973 should not be generally applied to all nomination clauses. Understanding the meaning of the clauses is 
more important rather than the nomination itself. 
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